The Fourth Circuit\u27s  Doube-Edged Sword : Eviscerating the Right to Present Mitigating Evidence and Beheading the Right to the Assistance of Counsel by Blume, John H. & Johnson, Sheri Lynn
Maryland Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 4 Article 7
The Fourth Circuit's "Doube-Edged Sword":
Eviscerating the Right to Present Mitigating
Evidence and Beheading the Right to the
Assistance of Counsel
John H. Blume
Sheri Lynn Johnson
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
John H. Blume, & Sheri L. Johnson, The Fourth Circuit's "Doube-Edged Sword": Eviscerating the Right to Present Mitigating Evidence and
Beheading the Right to the Assistance of Counsel, 58 Md. L. Rev. 1480 (1999)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol58/iss4/7
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S "DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD":
EVISCERATING THE RIGHT TO PRESENT MITIGATING
EVIDENCE AND BEHEADING THE RIGHT TO THE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
JOHN H. BLUME*
SHERI LYNN JOHNSON**
Even before the sea change of Gideon v. Wainwright,' the Supreme
Court recognized not only an indigent's right to the assistance of
counsel in capital cases, but also his right to the effective assistance of
counsel in capital cases.2 Since those auspicious beginnings, the
Court has dramatically broadened the right to present mitigating evi-
dence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial, thereby increasing the
need for the guiding hand of counsel in capital sentencing. Thus, it is
particularly tragic that the Fourth Circuit's swiftly evolving approach
to the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel stan-
dard3 precludes capital defendants from winning ineffective assistance
of counsel claims in the very cases where informed and effective assist-
ance would have been most likely to have made a difference.
According to the Fourth Circuit, all psychologically based mitigat-
ing evidence is a "two-edged sword," because "although 'evidence of a
defendant's mental impairment may diminish his blameworthiness for
* Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Director, Cornell Death Penalty Pro-
ject. Professor Blume served as counsel for J.D. Gleaton, whose case is discussed in Part
IIA infra.
** Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Co-Director, Cornell Death Penalty Project.
Professor Johnson served as counsel for Ronnie Howard, whose case is described briefly,
infra text accompanying note 175.
1. 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires the ap-
pointment of counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony).
2. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Court held:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is inca-
pable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mind-
edness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not,
to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that
duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circum-
stances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the
case.
Id. at 71.
3. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984) (finding that a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel requires defendant to show that counsel's deficient per-
formance prejudiced the defense, and defining prejudice as "a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different").
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his crime,' it also may 'indicate[ ] that there is a probability that he
will be dangerous in the future.' 4 Thus for habeas petitioners in the
Fourth Circuit, the possibility, however remote, that ajury would focus
on dangerousness rather than culpability precludes ever winning an
ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the failure to present psy-
chologically-based mitigating evidence, no matter how compelling the
neglected evidence is, or how derelict counsel was in failing to present
that evidence. As this Article will demonstrate, the double-edged
sword doctrine is wrong-headed in several respects. It both distorts
the Supreme Court's ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine and
renders the right to present mitigating evidence dependant upon
whether the defendant is lucky enough to be assigned competent
counsel. Moreover, it ignores generally recognized normative con-
straints on the imposition of the death penalty. Finally, its premise of
a double-edged sword is not empirically supported.
No other circuit has adopted or even explored the double-edged
sword doctrine, and even in the Fourth Circuit, this doctrine has most
often, but not always, appeared as an alternative holding.' This Arti-
cle hopes to persuade the reader that despite its newness, it is a doc-
trine already ripe for overruling-or reversal, if necessary. Part I
briefly describes the capital defendant's right to have available mitigat-
ing evidence presented to the sentencing body; the real dimensions of
this right can properly be understood only by considering both the
breadth of the abstract right to present mitigating evidence and the
limitations imposed by the interaction of that right with the ineffective
assistance of counsel doctrine. Part II describes how the Fourth Cir-
cuit's double-edged sword doctrine departs from established doctrine
and diminishes established rights. It begins with an example of the
doctrine in action, the case of J.D. Gleaton, who was executed by the
state of South Carolina on December 4, 1998. Gleaton's lawyer of-
fered no reason for his failure to present evidence that Gleaton was
organically brain-damaged and mentally ill, and the Fourth Circuit de-
4. Beavers v. Pruett, No. 97-4, 1997 WL 585739, at *4 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1997) (quot-
ing Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 980-81 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 324 (1989))), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Beavers, 1997 WL 585739, at *4 ("Moreover, even if [the defendant] had
overcome the presumption that counsel's performance was within the broad range of pro-
fessionally acceptable conduct, we are not convinced that he would have satisfied the preju-
dice prong of Strickland."); Barnes, 58 F.3d at 980 (asserting that even if the defendant
could "show that [counsel] should have presented the evidence of abuse and dysfunction,
it is unlikely that he could have satisfied Stricklands second requirement of a 'reasonable
probability' that the outcome would have been different but for [counsel's] failure to de-
velop this case in mitigation").
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nied Gleaton's petition for habeas corpus relief. The second half of
Part II then sketches the misguided development of the double-edged
sword doctrine that facilitated this denial. Part III presents the con-
ceptual and empirical fallacies of the Fourth Circuit's approach.
I. THE RIGHT TO HAVE MITIGATING EVIDENCE PRESENTED
After the Supreme Court struck down the death penalty in
Furman v. Georgia,6 it was not clear what sort of death penalty statute, if
any, could survive constitutional scrutiny.7 A number of states revised
their statutes in the hope of curing the arbitrariness and capricious-
ness that the Supreme Court had condemned. States tried two oppo-
site approaches, with some states opting for mandatory death penalty
statutes and others developing more elaborate statutory schemes spec-
ifying aggravating and mitigating factors that must be considered at
sentencing. The Supreme Court responded by upholding the latter8
and striking down North Carolina's broad mandatory scheme for its
"failure to allow the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of
the character and record of each convicted defendant before the im-
position upon him of a sentence of death."9 Moreover, the Court
deemed even Louisiana's narrower mandatory statute impermissible
because evolving standards of decency are inconsistent with "the be-
lief that 'every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical
punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular
offender."' 10 With these decisions, the Court laid the foundation for
constructing the expanded role that mitigation has come to play in
post-Furman capital sentencing law and practice.
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
7. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that in
Furman, " [f] our Justices would have held that capital punishment is not unconstitutional
per se: two Justices would have reached the opposite conclusion; and three Justices, while
agreeing that the statutes then before the Court were invalid as applied, left open the
question whether such punishment may ever be imposed" (footnotes omitted)).
8. In Gregg, the Court stated:
In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be
imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted
statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information
and guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best met by a system
that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is
apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided
with standards to guide its use of the information.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (plurality opinion).
9. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion).
10. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Wil-
liams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
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A. The Role of Mitigation in Capital Sentencing
Mitigating evidence neither justifies nor completely excuses an
offense, but it is evidence which "in fairness and mercy, may be con-
sidered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability.""1
The Supreme Court's mitigation decisions have reflected the breadth
of this type of evidence, and increasingly have stressed that the sen-
tencing body's possession of the fullest information possible concern-
ing the defendant's life and character is highly relevant, if not
essential, to the determination of the appropriate sentence.
In Lockett v. Ohio, 2 the first of the mitigation cases, a plurality of
the Court announced the general principle that:
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect
of a defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death."a
The Court employed this requirement of individualized sentencing in
striking down the Ohio statute at issue in Lockett because that statute
did not permit consideration of the defendant's age or relatively mi-
nor role in the offense. 4 Then in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 5 the Court
applied the Lockett rule to overturn a conviction where the sentencing
judge refused to consider evidence of "a turbulent family history, of
beatings by a harsh father, and of severe emotional disturbance."' 6
Hitchcock v. Dugger17 underscored the variety of psychological fac-
tors that fall within the ambit of Lockett. In the sentencing phase of his
trial, Hitchcock's counsel presented evidence that, as a child, Hitch-
cock had habitually inhaled gasoline, that on one occasion he had
passed out from doing so, that thereafter his mind wandered, that he
had been one of seven children in a poor family forced to pick cotton,
that his father had died of cancer, and that Hitchcock had been a
loving uncle."a Because the advisory jury was instructed to consider
only statutory mitigating circumstances, and the sentencing judge re-
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 903 (6th ed. 1990).
12. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
13. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion).
14. See id. at 608 (plurality opinion) ("The limited range of mitigating circumstances
which may be considered by the sentencer under the Ohio statute is incompatible with the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
15. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
16. Id. at 115.
17. 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
18. Id. at 397.
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fused to consider these other mitigating factors, the Court reversed
Hitchcock's sentence.19 Similarly, in Penry v. Lynaugh,2 ° the Court
held that the Texas death penalty statute did not provide the jury
"with a vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral response'" to evi-
dence of the defendant's mental retardation.21 Relying on Lockett and
Eddings, the Court deemed a resentencing remand necessary to avoid
the "'risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors
which may call for a less severe penalty."'22
Even mitigating evidence that does not relate to culpability for the
charged crime must be admitted under the Lockett principle, so long
as it may serve as a "basis for a sentence less than death."23 For exam-
ple, in Skipper v. South Carolina,24 the Court held that exclusion from
the sentencing hearing of proffered testimony regarding the defend-
ant's good behavior during pretrial incarceration violated the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.25 Moreover, in Simmons v. South Caro-
lina,26 the Court found that the defendant's statutory ineligibility for
parole, at least in a case where the prosecutor argued future danger-
ousness, might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death and
therefore must be presented to the jury upon the defendant's
request.27
The importance of mitigating evidence is also reflected in the
Court's treatment ,of statutes that require the imposition of the death
penalty when mitigation is absent or outweighed by aggravating fac-
tors. In Blystone v. Pennsylvania21 the Court upheld a statute which
required the sentencer to impose the death penalty upon finding at
least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances;29
in Boyde v. California30 the Court upheld a statute which required a
death sentence when aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigat-
ing circumstances.3" Moreover, in California v. Brown,12 the Court
19. Id. at 398-99.
20. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
21. Id. at 328.
22. Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion); citing
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 119 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
23. Id. at 318 (citing Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14).
24. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
25. Id. at 8.
26. 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion).
27. Id. at 156.
28. 494 U.S. 299 (1990).
29. Id. at 301, 309.
30. 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
31. Id. at 372-74, 377.
32. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
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deemed permissible instructions which informed jurors that they must
not be swayed by factors such as sentiment or sympathy, which instruc-
tions a reasonable juror would interpret, according to the Court, "as
an admonition to ignore emotional responses that are not rooted in
the aggravating and mitigating evidence.""3 In Mills v. Maryland,4 the
Court clarified that a state may not capitalize on disagreement regard-
ing the presence of mitigation as a justification for imposition of the
death penalty; juries may not be instructed to impose a sentence of
death merely because all of the jurors do not unanimously agree on
the existence of a mitigating circumstance.35
Although the Court has been adamant that the sentencer must
consider those "compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from
the diverse frailties of humankind,"36 and has defined those factors
broadly, the defendant's right to have relevant mitigating evidence ac-
tually presented to the jury depends not only upon what evidence the
state must allow the jury to consider, but also upon what evidence
defense counsel is constitutionally required to present. A jury can
consider evidence in mitigation only if trial counsel investigates and
vigorously presents such evidence. 7 What happens when counsel fails
to present mitigating evidence?
B. The Standard for Assessing Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
As noted at the beginning of this Article, the right to effective
assistance of counsel, like the right to any assistance at all, was first
recognized in a capital case.3" In Strickland v. Washington,9 the Court
explained that this right requires that counsel ensure that the adver-
sarial process works to produce a just result at the penalty phases of a
capital trial, as well as during the guilt phase.' When the adversarial
process fails due to counsel's ineffectiveness, the Sixth Amendment is
violated, and the verdict must be set aside.
33. Id. at 542.
34. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
35. Id. at 384.
36. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
37. See Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 277 (1993) (per curiam) ("Nothing in the Consti-
tution obligates state courts to give mitigating circumstance instructions when no evidence
is offered to support them.").
38. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
39. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
40. See id. at 687 (explaining that counsel's role at both trial and sentencing is "to
ensure that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the stan-
dards governing decision").
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In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court set forth the stan-
dard for determining counsel's ineffectiveness. That test is twofold:
was counsel's performance in fact deficient; and, if so, was this defi-
ciency prejudicial to the defense.41
In order to make the first determination, the proper inquiry is
whether counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reason-
ableness.42 In other words, a convicted, death-sentenced defendant
must show that the particular acts of counsel were outside the "wide
range of reasonable professional assistance."4" In order to satisfy the
prejudice requirement, the defendant "must show that there is a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."44
Although this is a stringent standard, it is significant that the
Strickland Court explicitly rejected the more stringent outcome-deter-
minative test in favor of the "reasonable probability" test for assessing
prejudice, despite the fact that the government had argued for the
outcome-determinative test.45 The Court carefully explained that "a
defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely
than not altered the outcome in the case";46 instead, a defendant is
prejudiced "even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a prepon-
derance of the evidence to have determined the outcome."47 Under
Strickland, then, a defendant satisfies the prejudice prong of the test
for ineffectiveness if he can demonstrate a reasonable probability that
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Such a
probability is proven if he can "undermine confidence in the
outcome."'
One of an attorney's principal duties is "to make reasonable in-
vestigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary."49 In a capital case, investigation of, prep-
aration for, and presentation of mitigating evidence at the penalty
phase is critical, and failure to prepare adequately and to present psy-
41. Id.
42. See id. at 688 ("The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply rea-
sonableness under prevailing professional norms.").
43. Id. at 689.
44. Id. at 694.
45. Id. at 693-94.
46. Id. at 693 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. Strickland 466 U.S. at 691; see, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184-85
(1986) (finding that counsel met Stricklands objective reasonableness standard where he
engaged in extensive pre-trial preparation and investigation for the penalty phase of de-
fendant's trial).
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chologically based evidence is a ground for finding ineffective assist-
ance of counsel.50
At this point, the reader unfamiliar with capital case post-convic-
tion litigation may think this all sounds pretty good. Indeed, she may
be wondering why we have asserted that ineffective assistance of coun-
sel doctrine limits the right to have mitigating evidence actually
presented to the sentencing body. Here it is important to point out
what we have neglected thus far: the special role that "strategy" plays
in assessing competence. In determining whether counsel's perform-
ance was in fact deficient, the Supreme Court has stressed that review-
ing courts should be deferential to strategic choices made by trial
counsel.5 ' Moreover, whether counsel made a "tactical" or "strategic"
decision is a question of historical fact ordinarily entitled to a pre-
sumption of correctness under the statutory rule governing federal
habeas claims,52 unless a review of the state court's factual findings
shows the decision was not supported by the record.53 Therefore, if
the trial attorney comes forward with a strategic explanation for a
seemingly incompetent action or omission, and the reviewing state
court credits that explanation, then the ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim will frequently founder on the first prong. The Supreme
Court has offered a dual rationale for this deference: the need "to
50. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that
"where counsel is on notice that his client may be mentally impaired, counsel's failure to
investigate his client's mental condition as a mitigating factor in a penalty phase hearing,
without a supporting strategic reason, constitutes deficient performance" (citing Deut-
scher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1989))); Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1357,
1368 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that counsel at sentencing was ineffective because of "a
reasonable chance that [defendant] would not have been sentenced to death if counsel
had effectively presented evidence of [defendant's] mental impairment at the penalty
phase"); Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant
was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel "did not reasonably investi-
gate his long history of mental problems and consequently did not present evidence of his
psychiatric problems at sentencing"); Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1992)
(same); Brewer v. Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 857-59 (7th Cir. 1991) (same). For empirical sup-
port for the proposition that mitigating evidence is important to jurors, see infra Part III.
51. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (noting that "counsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reason-
able professional judgment").
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2) (Supp. III 1997) (requiring that a writ of federal habeas
corpus shall not be granted unless the state decision "was based on an unreasonable deter-
mination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding").
53. See Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1462 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that, whether a
decision was tactical is a question of fact, and whether the tactic was reasonable is a ques-
tion of law, and asserting that a state court's judgment is entitled to deference only on the
former issue).
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eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight,"5 4 and the fact that there
are countless was to provide effective assistance in any given case.55
The Court in Strickland did note that before making a "strategic"
choice, "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to
make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations un-
necessary." 56 Consequently, the mere incantation of the word "strat-
egy" does not insulate an attorney's behavior from review if he has not
conducted a reasonable investigation that under the circumstances
would allow him to make an informed decision.57 Moreover, whether
a tactic was "within the range of professionally reasonable judg-
ments" 8 must still be determined by the reviewing court as a matter
of law.59
II. THE FOURTH CiRcurr's DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
In determining whether the failure to present psychological miti-
gating evidence constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland
requires a reviewing court to assess competence with deference to stra-
tegic decisions, and assess prejudice by determining whether there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would
have been different. The Fourth Circuit's "double-edged sword" rule,
however, creates an insurmountable barrier to finding prejudice in
cases where the claimed ineffectiveness relates to the presentation of
psychologically based mitigating evidence. The Fourth Circuit's appli-
cation of the double-edged sword doctrine to the case ofJ.D. Gleaton
is an illuminating example of the costs of this approach.
A. JD. Gleaton: An Extreme Example of the Fourth Circuit's Presumption
of No Prjudice
The case of J.D. Gleaton is a particularly compelling example of
the costs of the Fourth Circuit's approach because, under a conven-
54. The Fourth Circuit has ratcheted up its rhetoric by castigating "post-conviction at-
torneys [who] stroll in with the full benefit of hindsight to second-guess trial lawyers who
professionally discharge their duties to their clients under the manifold pressures of a state
trial." Mazzell v. Evatt, 88 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). One of the
authors "strolled in" to represent Mazzell.
55. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
56. Id. at 691.
57. See, e.g., Cave v. Singletary, 971 F.2d 1513,1518 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding attorney's
behavior unreasonable despite the fact that attorney called conduct "strategy"); Horton, 941
F.2d at 1461-62 (same); Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1025-26 (11th Cir. 1987)
(per curiam) (same).
58. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699.
59. See Horton, 941 F.2d at 1462 (noting that the evaluation of the reasonableness of a
tactic is a question of law on which the state court is not entitled to deference).
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tional analysis that considered the particulars of the case, it would be
impossible to conclude that this defendant suffered no prejudice from
his counsel's derelictions.
1. J.D. Gleaton's Life and Trial.--On July 12, 1977, after being
high for several days, J.D. Gleaton and his half-brother Larry Gilbert
stumbled upon Ralph Stoudemire's South Congaree, South Carolina
convenience store, looking for drugs or money.' Mr. Stoudemire re-
sisted when Gleaton pulled out a knife.6" In the ensuing struggle, Mr.
Stoudemire was killed.62 In his statement, admitted into evidence at
trial, Gleaton related:
On Tuesday morning, July 12, 1977, me and Larry Gilbert
were riding around in Cola. We went to a Soc station in
Cayce to try to buy some dope.... We had come [to] an-
other service station earlier and got some brake fluid for the
car. The guys at the Soc station in Cayce would not sell us
any dope, so we left. We rode around in Cola. some more
and went to another Soc station. I went in and asked the
man how much his cigarettes were and he told me and I said
I could get them cheaper somewhere else. Larry came in the
door so we could rob the man. We decided to rob the man
after we passed by and saw he was by himself. I was fixing to
pay the man for the cigarettes when Larry pulled the gun.
The man said something and hit me and we started to scuffle. I
pulled the knife out and stabbed him and Larry came up and
shot. I stabbed the man more than one time. I ran out the
door and didn't look for any money.63
Detective John Dauth corroborated Gleaton's statement by noting
that there appeared to have been "a tussle" in the storage room and
that a box containing cartons of cigarettes had been knocked over.'
Gilbert's statement to the police similarly gave no indication whatso-
ever that his brother had formed an intent to kill before he went into
the store.65 Gilbert stated that he was waiting outside when "[a] man
reached into his pocket and I ran into the station and shot the man
one time with a .22 caliber pistol."66 Moreover, the victim was still
60. Joint Appendix at 1823, 1981-82, Gilbert v. Moore, 134 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (No. 96-12, 96-16, 96-13, 96-15) [hereinafterJA].
61. Id. at 1982 (Gilbert's version); 1834, 2009-10 (Gleaton's version).
62. Id. at 1421 (stab wound to heart was cause of death); 1524 (account by victim's
son).
63. Id. at 2009-10 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 1538, 1543.
65. Id. at 1829-30.
66. Id. at 1830.
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standing when the brothers left,67 another indication that they did not
intend to kill him.
The state court litigation of this relatively unaggravated homicide
was in part a product of its times-the beginning of the post-Gregg6"
era in capital litigation in South Carolina. Only one attorney repre-
sented the two defendants in the capital trial, and then again at the re-
sentencing trial.69 Trial counsel did not speak to any of the state's
guilt-phase witnesses. He filed only a handful of form motions, and
he conducted no investigation into Gleaton's background or mental
state, even though the state hospital report indicated that Gleaton was
possibly brain damaged and borderline mentally retarded.7" He
hardly even spoke to his own client.71 Another bizarre thing he did
was to call both of his clients to the stand in the presence of the jury
and instruct them to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights during
cross-examination.72 Trial counsel had no excuse for his lack of prep-
aration. 7' He rebuffed offers of assistance and even pocketed extra
money that Gleaton's mother had given him for the express purpose
of finding a second attorney to assist with trial preparation. 4
What was even more surprising was his performance at the resen-
tencing trial several years later. It was so deficient that the resentenc-
ing judge took the unprecedented step of testifying about counsel's
"indifference" and "cavalier approach" as well as counsel's poor prepa-
ration and presentation of witnesses. 7 The trial judge characterized
67. Id. at 1520.
68. SeeGregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion) (finding that the
death penalty is not per se unconstitutional); supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
69. Neither the trial counsel nor the trial judge broached the obvious conflict of inter-
est until just before the first trial began. At that point, trial counsel simply told the trial
court that he did not see a conflict, and the matter was not discussed at all with Gleaton or
Gilbert. JA at 2051. In spite of these assurances, during the guilt phase, counsel called
both of his clients to testify. Counsel later observed that due to his multiple representa-
tion, he could not cross-examine each defendant to benefit the other. Id. at 2025.
Although the trial judge again touched on the conflict just before the penalty phase began,
neither he nor defense counsel explained the hazards of proceeding with joint representa-
tion to Gleaton, who was borderline mentally retarded and had organic brain damage. In
fact, trial counsel later admitted that he himself did not appreciate the full magnitude of
the conflict. Due to the debilitating conflict, trial counsel could not cross-examine Glea-
ton's co-defendant, argue that Gleaton was less culpable, or present any other evidence
that would have made Gleaton appear more sympathetic than Gilbert.
70. Id. at 4536.
71. Id. at 4141, 4146 (judge's comments); 4185, 4194 (law clerk's comments); 4379-83,
4388, 4396, 4436, 4467-77, 4482-83.
72. Id. at 4246.
73. Id. at 4332.
74. Id. at 4146, 4332.
75. Id. at 4141, 4146.
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counsel's performance as "poor" and "without [sic] the range" of
competence expected of counsel,76 and expressed dismay over coun-
sel's "indifference" and "cavalier approach."77 Indeed, the trial judge
also testified that he did not believe trial counsel "seriously ap-
proached" preparation for the trial,78 and that counsel did not seem
as concerned as the judge thought counsel should have been on the
eve of a capital trial.7 In fact, the judge declared that he would not
have hesitated to remove counsel if the court had appointed him to
represent petitioner."s On a scale of one to ten, the trial judge rated
counsel as a "two."81 Similarly, the judge's law clerk testified that
counsel "seemed to have no all consuming worry about his prepara-
tion for this trial," that counsel ignored his clients, and that he
seemed most concerned about not having to work late so that he
could spend time with his girlfriend. 2
The least defensible and most damaging of all of counsel's dere-
lictions was his neglect of the powerful mitigating evidence which was
easily available to him. Counsel unconscionably failed to investigate
or present any evidence of Gleaton's organic brain impairments, his
borderline mental retardation, his possible psychosis at the time of
the offense, his difficult struggle to break his heroin addiction, the
excruciatingly painful injuries that he suffered in a car accident, how
his efforts to deal with the agony from those injuries led him back to
drugs, his otherwise peaceful and nonviolent character, his relation-
ship with his family and children, or his solid employment history.
3
All of this information was easily accessible to counsel, who spent
virtually no time at all talking to Gleaton about Gleaton's past."4 Even
though Gleaton faced a sentencing retrial in which the only decision
was whether he would live or die, counsel presented only two mitiga-
tion witnesses, one of whom knew next to nothing about Gleaton. s5
76. Id. at 4141.
77. Id. at 4146.
78. Id. at 4130.
79. Id. at 4136.
80. Id. at 4146.
81. Id. at 4138.
82. Id. at 4185, 4194.
83. Id. at 4364-77.
84. Id. at 4536-38, 4553.
85. At the retrial, counsel called Gradie Fulmer, who was Gleaton's minister and who
inadvertently made Gleaton seem more culpable than Gilbert Fulmer stated that he did
not have much contact with Gleaton and, although counsel's apparent purpose was to
stress Gleaton's religious devotion, Fulmer informed the jury that Gleaton was not very
active in the church before he moved to Florida. Id. at 3727-28. Counsel also called Lizzie
Gilbert, Gleaton's mother. She told the jury only that Gleaton had gone to church until he
moved to Florida at age seventeen, that he had moved back and had held a job at Morri-
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Despite the knowledge that he was representing an illiterate, border-
line mentally retarded man with organic brain damage, a drug prob-
lem, and no significant experience with the criminal justice system for
even nonviolent offenses, 6 counsel did not discuss possible witnesses
or make an attempt to locate witnesses; he made only one trip to Glea-
ton's hometown of Salley, South Carolina, the purpose of which was
to pick up his fee. 7 Counsel did not seek any expert assistance de-
spite the state hospital's report that Gleaton possibly had an organic
brain impairment and was borderline mentally retarded."8 Counsel
admitted that he was focused on the narrow question of Gleaton's
competency to stand trial and did not grasp the broader significance
of that report.8 9 The problem was not financial: Gleaton's mother
stated that counsel never asked her to raise money for a
psychologist.9 °
Mental health expert assistance, basic investigation, and the sim-
ple chore of spending time with his clients would have enabled coun-
sel to make a profound difference at Gleaton's sentencing retrial.
The mitigating evidence available in this case was extraordinary. Glea-
ton's problems began at birth due to either a prenatal disease or con-
dition that caused his borderline mental retardation.9 1 Subsequent
neuropsychological tests indicated that he was brain damaged.92 He
was raised by his grandparents, who were sharecroppers. 93 When he
was six years old, Gleaton too was forced to work on the farm picking
son's until he had an accident, and that he had never been in trouble before. Id. at 3730-
31, 3733.
86. Id. at 4535-36. Gleaton was convicted in 1965 for breaking a public telephone and
in 1972 for shoplifting fishing equipment worth only about one dollar. Id. at 4366.
87. Id. at 4305. Counsel claimed that he at least had asked his clients if they could
think of any witnesses who could be helpful. Id. at 4817. Gleaton explained, however, that
he had thought counsel was referring to alibi witnesses, and Gilbert stated that he did not
fully understand the process of a capital trial because it was the first time he had any
dealings with a lawyer or the criminal justice system. Id. at 4484.
88. Id. at 4536-38, 4553.
89. Id. at 4825. Counsel also called Gleaton and Gilbert to the stand. Gleaton testified
that he had worked as a cook in Florida, had moved back to South Carolina and had taken
a job at Morrison's Cafeteria as a cook, a job he held until he became disabled in an
automobile accident. Id. at 3738. Gleaton also testified that he and Gilbert had been
together before the incident, getting high on amphetamines and marijuana. Id. at 3739.
He denied that he had an intent to harm the victim and attributed his actions to the effects
of the speed he had been taking. Gilbert corroborated parts of Gleaton's account of the
offense. Counsel, however, neither cross-examined Gilbert to highlight his greater culpa-
bility, nor argued to the jury that Gleaton was less culpable than Gilbert.
90. Id. at 4332.
91. Id. at 4536.
92. Id. at 4536-38.
93. Id. at 4358.
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cotton.9 4 During his adolescence, he had to feed, carry around, and
change the diapers of an older, invalid uncle. 5 He attended school
only as far as the sixth grade, failed several grades, and never learned
to read because the "boss man" threatened to evict the family from
the land if Gleaton attended school instead of working.9 6 At age sev-
enteen, when he was earning only $2 per day on the farm, Gleaton
moved to Florida.9 7
After working for some time as a migrant farm worker, Gleaton
found ajob as a cook.98 He met his wife, and they had a daughter.9 9
He had no problems with the law, he was steadily employed, and by all
accounts he was a devoted father and peaceful man.' 0 He did be-
come addicted to heroin, but checked himself into a rehabilitation
hospital and later moved back to South Carolina to avoid the drug-
saturated environment of Florida.' 0 ' With the help of his family, he
overcame his addiction to heroin and found a full-time job as a cook
in Columbia.
1 2
Gleaton's new life was shattered, however, when his neck and
both ankles were broken in an automobile accident. 10 3 To set his
neck, doctors installed a halo brace that was held in place by four pins
that were screwed into his skull.' 0 4 Because of the pins, Gleaton had
to keep the brace on at all times for six months. The brace was ex-
traordinarily painful, and the pins often felt like they were pushing
further into his skull.10 5 Gleaton kept his family awake many nights
crying in pain. Although he went to the doctor several times, even at
three or four o'clock in the morning, 0 6 doctors were unable success-
fully to readjust the brace. 10 7 Overdoses of the prescribed painkillers
did nothing to diminish the excruciating agony.' 8 Eventually, when
legal drugs could not ease his suffering, Gleaton returned to heroin
despite the shame and disappointment that it caused.10 9
94. Id. at 4359.
95. Id. at 4361.
96. Id. at 4360.
97. Id. at 4362.
98. Id. at 4364.
99. Id. at 4365.
100. Id. at 4365-67.
101. Id. at 4367.
102. Id. at 4369.
103. Id. at 4369-70.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 4371.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 4371-72.
109. Id. at 4297, 4372-73.
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Later, Gleaton turned to amphetamines, marijuana, and Valium.
In the days preceding the offense, he injected speed every four to six
hours and smoked one marijuana cigarette per hour."1 He did not
sleep and ate only cinnamon rolls and drank orange juice during that
period."1 ' As expert testimony could have informed the jury, such
misuse of amphetamines causes aggressive, impulsive behavior; over-
doses of speed also cause acute anxiety and can even trigger a psycho-
tic state like schizophrenia.' 12  Such information would have
corroborated Gleaton's testimony that he had lost his senses once his
struggle with the victim began and that he was not aware that he was
striking Mr. Stoudemire's body.11
Finally, probably because of his traumatic and deprived child-
hood, Gleaton was mentally ill with a borderline personality disor-
der.114 This disorder made him more susceptible to developing a
drug problem and also exacerbated the effects of the drugs.11 More-
over, the borderline personality disorder caused Gleaton to have dis-
turbances in his thinking, sharp mood swings which were not
necessarily tied to anything happening in his life, problems with inter-
personal relationships, and a tendency toward impulsive actions.116
Under stressful conditions, he could drift into a psychotic state;" 7
under the influence of amphetamines, he would be likely to be er-
ratic, impulsive, and paranoid."1 Finally, due to his limitations and
personality disorder, Gleaton was close to being incompetent." 9 He
had to have matters explained to him very carefully, and his attorney
should have spent more time talking to him to develop a trusting rela-
tionship. 2 Instead, however, counsel hardly visited his clients even
after their family repeatedly implored him to see them. 12 1
2. The Fourth Circuit's Response.-The Fourth Circuit was un-
moved by counsel's abysmal performance, the extraordinary accumu-
lation of overlooked mitigating evidence, and the complete absence
of any strategic reason for failing to investigate or present this evi-
110. Id. at 4377-78, 4427-29, 4462-63.
111. Id.
112. Such testimony was presented at the post-conviction hearing. See id. at 4533, 4589.
113. Id. at 3751-52.
114. Id. at 4536-38, 4553.
115. Id. at 4553.
116. Id. at 4539-42.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 4560.
119. Id. at 4549.
120. Id. at 4546, 4555-58.
121. Id. at 4304, 4337.
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dence. 122 The court determined that Gleaton's ineffectiveness claim
failed both the competence and prejudice prongs of the Strickland
test.125 While the second prong is of interest here, we digress a mo-
ment to observe that the court's evaluation of the competence prong
was as bizarre as its evaluation of prejudice was unjustifiable.
The court found that counsel was not deficient for failing to pres-
ent psychological expert testimony because the state hospital report
"did not suggest any serious mental or emotional problems warranting
further investigation for potentially mitigating evidence,"124 which is
impossible to reconcile with the state hospital's determination that
Gleaton was borderline mentally retarded and that he suffered from
organic brain damage, both of which the hospital attributed to prena-
tal causes. 125 The court's finding was especially strange in view of the
fact that counsel never articulated a strategic reason for failing to con-
duct the investigation, but instead conceded that he did not realize
that the hospital report was relevant to any issue other than compe-
tence to stand trial. 1 6 Counsel also conceded that he had no tactical
reason for not seeking expert assistance about Gleaton's drug use or
for not presenting evidence about the painful and tragic conse-
quences of the halo brace, and even acknowledged that further inves-
tigation would have been helpful.1
27
In response to the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to
procure the testimony of other witnesses who might have been able to
present mitigating evidence, the court mockingly stated that counsel
was not "constitutionally required to interview every family member,
neighbor, and coworker in the search for mitigating evidence."'
28
This assertion is neither true nor fair. The state court testimony estab-
lished that counsel conducted almost no investigation, had very little
contact with Gleaton, failed to present any significant testimony from
people who were well acquainted with Gleaton even though those wit-
nesses were readily available and willing to testify, and never explained
to Gleaton or his family the nature and purpose of mitigating evi-
122. See Gilbert v. Moore, 134 F.3d 642, 654-55 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom.
Gleaton v. Moore, 119 S. Ct. 103 (1998).
123. Id. at 655 (concluding that counsel's performance was "within the broad range of
professionally acceptable conduct," and stating that even if counsel's conduct did not meet
that standard, "we are not convinced that [petitioners] have satisfied the prejudice prong
of Strickland').
124. Id. at 654.
125. JA at 4536.
126. Id. at 4825.
127. Id. at 4864-66.
128. Gilbert, 134 F.3d at 655.
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dence. 12 9 What is most unusual here is not the court's finding of com-
petent representation, but that the court made this finding despite
the absence of either reasonable investigation by counsel or a deliber-
ate, reasoned choice to forego such investigation. In short, deference
to trial strategy cannot explain the Fourth Circuit's decision on the
competence prong.1 3
0
As cavalier as the Fourth Circuit's discussion of counsel's per-
formance was, the court's analysis of prejudice caused by counsel's
performance was even worse. Instead of applying the standard articu-
lated in Strickland of whether there was a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding
would have been different," 1 the Fourth Circuit merely stated:
"Although evidence that a defendant suffers from a mental impair-
ment or has abused drugs or narcotics may diminish his blameworthi-
ness for his crime, this evidence is a two-edged sword."'13 Abjuring
the question of reasonable probability that a juror would have been
swayed by the specific mitigating evidence proffered in post-convic-
tion, and ignoring its likely impact in a relatively unaggravated case,
the Fourth Circuit found the mere possibility that a juror would have
viewed the proffered evidence as aggravating rather than mitigating a
sufficient basis to dismiss the claim.' Unvarnished speculation is all
the en banc court offered; the court did not even explain how the
evidence of Gleaton's mental impairment or drug abuse was "two-
edged," nor did it point to a reason why counsel might have thought
that such evidence would have been damaging. It is highly doubtful,
if not inconceivable, that a reasonable juror would have viewed the
evidence as "two-edged," especially because in Gleaton's trial the jury
heard the worst aspects of the testimony about drugs and the offense
129. JA at 4302, 4332, 4380-81, 4709-20.
130. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (stating that "counsel has a
duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes partic-
ular investigations unnecessary"); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 28 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1994)
("Reasonable performance of counsel includes an adequate investigation of facts, consider-
ation of viable theories, and development of evidence to support those theories." (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1993)));
Foster, 9 F.3d at 726 ("Although we generally give great deference to an attorney's informed
strategic choices, we closely scrutinize an attorney's preparatory activities." (citing Cham-
bers v. Armontrout, 907 F.2d 825, 831, 835 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc))).
131. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ("The defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.").
132. Gilbert, 134 F.3d at 655 (citing Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 420-21 (4th Cir.
1997) (en banc)).
133. Id. (noting that "[t]he evidence that Petitioners argue would have been obtained if
counsel had performed competently does not undermine our confidence in the verdict").
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itself without hearing any testimony, expert or otherwise, in
mitigation.1 3
4
Under the court's analysis, every ineffectiveness of counsel allega-
tion for failing to present evidence on behalf of the client will neces-
sarily fail. The Fourth Circuit will simply imagine how a juror might
possibly view the mitigating evidence in a negative light, find that the
mitigating evidence is "two-edged," and conclude that the defendant
cannot show prejudice. Since Gleaton's case was decided, the Fourth
Circuit has employed this "two-edged" rationale in subsequent capital
cases to evade application of the Stickland prejudice test. The court
has invoked this rationale in dismissing evidence of a defendant's or-
ganic brain dysfunction, 3 ' evidence of a defendant's abuse as a
child," 6 and evidence of a defendant's drug addiction, a history of
abuse, and mental impairment.
l3 7
The Fourth Circuit's double-edged sword rationale simply does
not comport with the Supreme Court's holding in Strickland. Under
Strickland, properly applied, the prejudice to Gleaton is plain. Due to
counsel's inadequate performance, the jury never learned that Glea-
ton had organic brain impairments, suffered from a borderline per-
sonality disorder, and was borderline mentally retarded. This type of
evidence alone would have radically changed the picture of the case,
and all other circuits that have addressed this issue have held that
counsel's performance is prejudicial for failure to present exactly this
type of evidence. 3 8 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit's approach is also
134. JA at 4536-38, 4553.
135. See Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 162 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding reasonable a
lawyer's decision not to present juvenile reports of defendant's mental retardation or brain
damage because his mental health expert disagreed with them, and because such mental
health evidence is a double-edged sword (citing Truesdale v. Moore, 142 F.3d 749, 755
(4th Cir. 1998))); Tnzesda/e, 142 F.3d at 754 ("Mental health evidence like that of Trues-
dale's organic brain dysfunction is a double-edged sword that might as easily have con-
demned Truesdale to death as excused his actions."), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 380 (1998).
136. King v. Greene, No. 97-28, 1998 WL 183909, at *12 (4th Cir. Apr. 20, 1998) (stating
that counsel's failure to present additional evidence of child abuse was not prejudicial
because "the jury might have interpreted such a history of abuse as evidence that King
would be dangerous in the future" (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 4 (1998).
137. Johnson v. Moore, No. 97-33, 1998 WL 708691, at *13 (4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1998)
("Although evidence that a defendant suffers from a mental impairment, has abused drugs
or narcotics, or suffered a history of abuse may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime,
this evidence is a double-edged sword that a jury could well find to be aggravating rather
than mitigating." (citing Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 421 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc))),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1340 (1999).
138. See Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1520 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
prejudice prong of Strickland was satisfied because of counsel's failure to investigate and
present mitigating evidence relating to defendant's mental condition); Emerson v.
Gramley, 91 F.3d 898, 906-07 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); DeLuca v. Lord, 77 F.2d 578, 588-90
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inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Zant v. Stephens.1 39
In Stephens, the Court stated that reviewing courts must not label as
aggravating "conduct that actually should militate in favor of a lesser
penalty, such as perhaps the defendant's mental illness"14 -exactly
what the Fourth Circuit does in its double-edged sword cases.
As this Article went to press, the Supreme Court decided Williams
v. Taylor,14 1 which casts further doubt upon the double-edged sword
doctrine. Williams does not directly address the double-edged sword
doctrine, but it holds that the defendant was denied the effective
assistance of counsel due to his counsel's failure to present mitigating
evidence of severe childhood abuse and borderline mental retarda-
tion. In the course of finding that Williams was "prejudiced" by these
omissions, the Court noted that the unpresented evidence "might well
have influenced the jury's appraisal of his moral culpability."1 42 As
would be consistent with Stephens-but not with the Fourth Circuit's
approach-the Supreme Court did not even considerwhether such evi-
dence might be viewed as aggravating, let alone presume that aggravat-
ing effects would cancel out mitigating effects.
B. The Manufacture of the Double-Edged Sword
How did the Fourth Circuit come to this strange distortion of
Strickland? Certainly the Fourth Circuit has always been particularly
inhospitable to ineffective assistance of counsel claims in capital cases;
it is the only circuit that has never found counsel to be ineffective in a
capital case. Thus one might predict that if the double-edged sword
doctrine would be adopted anywhere, the Fourth Circuit would be the
place. Putting predisposition aside, however, it is easy to trace the
origins of the Fourth Circuit's replacement for the Strickland prejudice
test.
Ironically, the double-edged sword doctrine stems from a funda-
mental misunderstanding of Penry v. Lynaugh,143 a case that estab-
lished the right to present evidence of mental retardation to a capital
sentencing jury. 44 In Penry, the Supreme Court found that evidence
(2d Cir. 1996) (same); Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1211 (6th Cir. 1995) (same);
Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1387 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d
1501, 1515 (11th Cir. 1995) (same); Hill v. Lockhart, 28 F.3d 832, 847 (8th Cir. 1994)
(same); Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149, 160 (5th Cir. 1992) (same).
139. 462 U.S. 862 (1983)
140. Id. at 885.
141. 120 S. Ct. 1479 (2000).
142. Id. at 1515.
143. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
144. Id. at 328.
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of Penry's childhood abuse and mental retardation were beyond the
reach of the three factors (called "special issues") presented to the
jury at sentencing under the Texas statutory scheme, particularly the
issue concerning future dangerousness. 4 ' As the Court explained, ev-
idence of a defendant's mental impairment "is... a two-edged sword:
it may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates
that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future."
146
Because Penry's mitigating evidence suggested an answer of "yes" to
the issue concerning future dangerousness, the jury, absent additional
instructions, would have been unable adequately to consider the miti-
gating character of his retardation and abuse in assessing whether
Penry deserved to die; as the Court put the point, the special issue on
future dangerousness "did not provide a vehicle for the jury to give
mitigating effect to Penry's evidence of mental retardation and child-
hood abuse."
147
The Penry Court was clear that double-edged evidence could, in
fact, make a difference even in the context of the narrowly-framed
special issues, provided that the jury was properly instructed. 14 ' The
Fourth Circuit, however, has taken the Supreme Court's discussion in
Penry about the double-edged character of some types of mitigating
evidence completely out of context. Instead of recognizing that even
double-edged mitigation evidence can and does make a favorable im-
pression on jurors, the Fourth Circuit has assumed, without empirical
or doctrinal justification, that ajury is so likely to choose to interpret
this type of evidence in an exclusively negative fashion that a lawyer's
failure to present it is never prejudicial to a defendant.
Barnes v. Thompson149 is the first Fourth Circuit case to incorpo-
rate the Penry language into its discussion of an ineffectiveness
claim.' ' In Barnes, the court found that the mitigating evidence that
145. Id. at 322-28 (determining that the jury instructions did not allow the jury to give
effect to mitigating evidence in responding to three special issues).
146. Id. at 324.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 326 (noting that "in the absence of appropriate jury instructions, a reason-
able juror could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that
Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence").
149. 58 F.3d 971 (4th Cir. 1995).
150. See id. at 980-81 (stating that "evidence of a defendant's mental impairment 'may
diminish his blameworthiness for this crime even as it indicates that there is a probability
that he will be dangerous in the future'" (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 324)). The Fourth
Circuit had previously discussed the "double-edged" character of some mitigating evi-
dence, but only in the context of counsel's strategic reasons for not pursuing it. See Smith
v. Procunier, 769 F.2d 170, 173 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that counsel was not ineffective for
failing to explore the defendant's potentially mitigating mental deficiency because "inquiry
into the area meant resort to a double-edged sword, requiring the application of profes-
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had not been produced at trial could also have been used to support a
finding of future dangerousness, which under Virginia law functions
as an aggravating circumstance. 5' Significantly, however, the Fourth
Circuit also noted that trial counsel testified that for strategic reasons
he sought to avoid any possible evidence of future dangerousness. 15 2
Thus Barnes is not a true double-edged sword case, but instead a gar-
den variety reasonable-strategic-choice case. So far so good.
However, relying on Barnes, the Fourth Circuit next found coun-
sel's failure to present evidence of mental impairments harmless in
Beavers v. Pruett.l ' Rather than asking whether there was a reasonable
probability that the result would have been different, the court simply
held that the jury "could well have found" the mitigating evidence
sufficient to support a finding of future dangerousness."5 4 Although
Beavers was also a Virginia case, and therefore a focus on future dan-
gerousness was statutorily mandated, it was not long before the "could
well have found" formulation replaced the Strickland "reasonable
probability" test, even in cases from states in which future dangerous-
ness is not an aggravating circumstance. 155
sional judgement whether to pursue a subject that already had proved unproductive"),
aff'd sub nom. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
151. Barnes, 58 F.3d at 980-81. Even though in Virginia, like Texas, the jury is asked to
consider a defendant's future dangerousness, Virginia jurors have never been restricted to
answering special issues and thus have had a vehicle for giving mitigating effect to double-
edged evidence. SeeVA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie Supp. 1995) (listing as an aggra-
vating factor "that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society"). Thus, even in Vir-
ginia, Penry is inapposite.
152. Barnes, 58 F.3d at 980 (stating that Barnes's attorney "testified that he . . . con-
cluded that his primary task at the sentencing hearing was to prevent a finding of 'future
dangerousness,'" and noting that "[t]his tactical approach required that [counsel] portray
Barnes as a sane or nonviolent individual").
153. No. 97-4, 1997 WL 585739, at *4 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 621
(1997).
154. Id. at *4 (quoting Barnes, 58 F.3d at 981).
155. SeeJohnson v. Moore, No. 97-33, 1998 WL 708691, at *14 (4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1998)
("Although evidence that a defendant suffers from a mental impairment, has abused drugs
or narcotics, or suffered a history of abuse may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime,
this evidence is a double-edged sword that a jury could well find to be aggravating rather
than mitigating." (citing Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 421 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc))),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1340 (1999); Truesdale v. Moore, 142 F.3d 749, 755 (4th Cir.)
("Mental health evidence like that of Truesdale's organic brain dysfunction is a double-
edged sword that might as easily have condemned Truesdale to death as excused his ac-
tions."), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct 380 (1998); Gilbert v. Moore, 134 F.3d 642, 655 (4th Cir.) (en
banc) ("Although evidence that a defendant suffers from a mental impairment or has
abused drugs or narcotics may diminish his blameworthiness for the crime, this evidence is
a two-edged sword." (citing Howard, 131 F.3d at 420-21)), cert. denied sub nom. Gleaton v.
Moore, 119 S. Ct. 103 (1998); Howard, 131 F.3d at 420-22 (same).
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The Fourth Circuit now applies the label "double-edged" in a
knee-jerk manner even to evidence that any reasonable person would
deem mitigating, despite the fact that reasonable people could dis-
agree as to how much weight that evidence should be given. For ex-
ample, in King v. Greene,156 the Fourth Circuit actually held that evi-
dence of the defendant's childhood sexual abuse "might have" been
seen as an indication of future dangerousness, and thus as aggravat-
ing.1" 7 Even if a hard-boiled cynic could imagine some way in which
this type of evidence really is "double-edged" or does not render the
defendant less culpable than someone not so disadvantaged, that does
not mean that a petitioner fails Strickland's "reasonable probability"
test, which, read in conjunction with Mills v. Maryland,'58 arguably re-
quires that only one juror would have been swayed by the mitigating
evidence.159
III. THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD: EMPIRICALLY INDEFENSIBLE AND
DOCTRINALLY DISASTROUS
With Barnes, the Fourth Circuit began to incorporate language
about double-edged evidence from Penry into a context in which it did
not fit. The court next began to imagine the ways in which certain
types of evidence could be viewed as double-edged and then con-
cluded that failure to present evidence of that sort can never be preju-
dicial. And in light of cases decided in the last few months, it is clear
that Gleaton's case is no aberration; the court has now reached the
bottom of the slippery slope and has effectively held Strickland inappli-
cable to capital sentencing in Fourth Circuit states.
It is easy to demonstrate that the doubled-edge sword doctrine
departs from Strickland, but it is, of course, another question whether
this departure from Supreme Court precedent is otherwise an unde-
sirable innovation. In fact, however, both an examination of relevant
empirical data and an analysis of the doctrine's inherent contradic-
tions reveal the undesirability, and indeed the injustice, of the Fourth
Circuit's double-edged sword.
156. No. 97-28, 1998 WL 183909 (4th Cir. Apr. 20, 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 4 (1998).
157. Id. at *12.
158. 486 U.S. 367 (1988); see also supra text accompanying notes 34-35 (discussing Mills).
159. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the prejudice prong of Strick-
land). The Fourth Circuit has explicitly rejected the one juror rule. Williams v. Taylor, 189
F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 120 S. Ct. 1479 (2000).
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A. The Double-Edged Sword Doctrine Has No Support in Available
Empirical Data
The double-edged sword doctrine hypothesizes that evidence that
seems intuitively mitigating may be, in the minds of some jurors, actu-
ally aggravating." Put differently, the court speculates that for some
subset of jurors, psychological evidence which decreases the defend-
ant's moral culpability may be interpreted as also increasing his future
dangerousness, and for some subset of this subset, that that increase
in perceived future dangerousness will outweigh the decrease in per-
ceived culpability, thereby increasing the likelihood of a death sen-
tence. Stated in this weak form, the underlying empirical proposition
is undoubtedly true. However, stated in this weak form, no inference
concerning prejudice is warranted. If, for example, only one juror in
100 took this view, it is unlikely that such a juror would sit on the
defendant's jury. Thus, his or her views would be irrelevant to the
assessment of prejudice.
Given the structure of capital sentencing, a much stronger empir-
ical claim would have to be made to justify an inference of no preju-
dice. Even if jurors were equally split about the net effect of a
neglected kind of mitigation evidence, the double-edged sword con-
clusion would be unwarranted. In South Carolina, for example, if a
sentencing jury cannot agree upon a verdict, the defendant receives a
life sentence."' The case for inferring prejudice from the omission of
a factor would seem strong if half of the jurors would perceive a factor
as greatly increasing the likelihood that they would vote for death
while half would perceive it as greatly decreasing the likelihood of a
vote for death. In fact, if even one in twelve jurors would perceive a
factor as weighing heavily toward life-and would remain committed
to that view-an inference of prejudice would seem warranted.
One can, of course, imagine post-conviction counsel labeling evi-
dence "mitigating" that a reasonable jury would nearly unanimously
view as more aggravating than mitigating. If the defendant tortured
his victim, this could be argued to be mitigating in so far as it is likely
to reflect mental illness, but one could be confident that the omission
160. See King, 1998 WL 183909, at *12 ("[Wlhether or not counsel should have
presented more extensive evidence of the abuse [the defendant] suffered as a child, not
presenting such further evidence did not prejudice [the defendant]. In fact, more such
evidence might have harmed [his] defense.").
161. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1998); see also Stephen P. Gar-
vey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. Ray.
1538, 1549 (1998) ("The jury's sentencing decision, whether for life imprisonment or for
death, must be unanimous; otherwise, the defendant is sentenced by operation of law to
'life imprisonment.'").
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of such evidence from the defense case was not prejudicial. It does
not, however, take the two-edged sword doctrine to reach that conclu-
sion. Rather, following the conventional Strickland analysis, one would
first observe that the "reasonable competence" prong was not satis-
fied, and then note that the claim also fails on the prejudice prong
because there is no reasonable likelihood that the presentation of that
evidence would have altered the jury's verdict. With respect to bizarre
forms of "mitigating" evidence, it is reasonable to assume an absence
of prejudice, and not to require empirical support for this assump-
tion. It is also beside the point, because a lawyer would never be
found to have acted outside professional standards for failing to pre-
sent such evidence.
The mitigating evidence omitted in Gleaton's case-and the
other Fourth Circuit double-edged sword cases-is not, however, of
the bizarre sort. Mental retardation, organic brain damage, child-
hood abuse or extreme hardship, mental illness, drug addiction, and
alcoholism are all conventional forms of mitigating evidence. As such,
strong empirical assumptions that virtually all jurors would find such
evidence more aggravating than mitigating seem completely
unwarranted.
Indeed, to the extent that there is relevant empirical data, it sup-
ports the inference that failure to present significant psychologically
based mitigating evidence is prejudicial. Poll data from 1997 shows a
population that is very receptive to such evidence.162 Only forty-seven
percent of the population favor imposition of the death penalty on
persons who were severely abused as a child; only fifty-five percent
favor its imposition on persons who were under the influence of drugs
or alcohol at that time of the offense.16 Most strikingly, in 1995, only
nine percent of the population favored imposition of the death pen-
alty on mentally retarded defendants. 1"
Data from the Capital Jury Project point in the same direction.
Seventy-four percent of the surveyed capital jurors from South Caro-
lina said that if the defendant were mentally retarded, they would be
less likely to vote for the death penalty, and only three percent said
that mental retardation would make them more likely to vote for the
162. See Samuel . Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty-It's Getting
Personal 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1448, 1469 (1998) (noting that "[w]hen confronted with only
one of several disparate factors-from becoming a different person in jail to having suf-
fered severe abuse as a child-support for the death penalty drops considerably").
163. Id. at 1468.
164. Id.
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death penalty. 165 A history of mental illness also influences far more
of those jurors surveyed away from the death penalty (fifty-six per-
cent) than toward it (three percent). 66 Serious abuse as a child made
thirty-seven percent less likely to impose the death penalty and only
one percent more likely to do so.' 6 7 Even with respect to alcoholism,
more than twice as many jurors were less inclined to impose the death
penalty if the defendant were alcoholic (thirteen percent) than were
more likely to impose it (five percent)." Only drug addiction was
more often viewed as aggravating than mitigating; even here, however,
the numbers were close, with nearly ten percent of jurors stating that
it decreased the likelihood of imposing death and nearly twelve per-
cent saying the opposite.1
69
Thus, with respect to any of the traditional forms of psychologi-
cally based mitigation about which data exists, there is no support for
a blanket assumption that presentation of such evidence would not
alter the jury's determination of the sentence. Of course there might
be particularly aggravated cases in which it would be reasonable to
determine that failure to present one of the less persuasive forms of
mitigation evidence would have made no difference; it would also be
reasonable to determine, even in a relatively unaggravated case, that
the neglected evidence of a particular psychological condition was so
weak that its omission did not create prejudice. Such determinations,
however, would not be examples of the double-edged sword per se
rule, but instead would be Strickland mandated analyses of the actual
prejudice that flowed from a particular omission in a particular
context.
B. The Double-Edged Sword Doctrine Thwarts the Right to Present
Mitigating Evidence and Robs Ineffective Assistance Doctrine
of Coherence
Looking to precedent, it is plain that the double-edged sword
doctrine deviates from the established Strickland standard; looking to
available empirical data, it is clear that this reformulation of Strickland
misstates likely juror responses to mitigating evidence, and therefore
presumes no prejudice in many cases where an informed Strickland
analysis would find prejudice. The only question that remains then is
whether there is a justification for preferring the double-edged sword
165. Garvey, supra note 161, at 1559.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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doctrine to Strickland Whether one considers this question from the
vantage point of the right to present mitigating evidence or from the
vantage point of the right to counsel, however, the Fourth Circuit's
creation is indefensible.
1. Thwarting the Right to Present Mitigating Evidence. -As discussed
in Part I, mitigation plays a central role in current capital punishment
jurisprudence. Ultimately, it is mitigation that provides the individual-
izedjudgment that saves capital punishment from invalidity under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 7 ° The right to present mitigat-
ing evidence is therefore a broad one, but it has roulette wheel signifi-
cance to the capital defendant unless it is fortified by a right to
effective assistance of counsel in sentencing. Certainly Strickland itself
provides less than comprehensive support for the right to present mit-
igating evidence, because both the competence prong and the preju-
dice prong contain avenues for dismissing the failure to present
mitigating evidence.
Under Strickland, failure to present mitigating evidence will some-
times, but not always, satisfy the competence prong. The defendant's
attorney may choose not to present mitigating evidence, believing that
it conflicts with her theory of the case; for example, she may choose
not to present evidence of mental illness out of concern that the jury
will infer that the defendant, rather than his codefendant, was more
likely to have tortured the victim. Or, in very narrow circumstances,
the defendant's attorney may reasonably conclude that the available
mitigating evidence, for example, unadorned evidence of drug use, is
more likely to harm the defendant than to help him. These reason-
able strategic choices preclude a finding that the attorney's assistance
was outside the range of competence, and in that sense, limit the right
to present mitigating evidence. This limitation, however, at least in
theory, derives from the pursuit of the defendant's overriding interest
in decreasing the likelihood of a death sentence. Unless a reviewing
court irresponsibly uses "strategic choice" as a mantra, it is only where
the attorney reasonably believed that not presenting mitigation evi-
dence was in the defendant's best interest that an ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claim for failure to present such evidence would
founder on the competence prong.
Under Strickland, ineffective assistance in sentencing claims may
also fail because the defendant cannot show a "reasonable probability"
that neglecting to present mitigating evidence altered the outcome of
170. See supra notes 10-27 and accompanying text.
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the trial. This constraint on the right to present mitigating evidence,
unlike the strategy constraint, does not serve the defendant in any
way. It is supposed to conserve resources, and it does so at the ex-
pense of the defendant's interest in avoiding a death sentence. Even
if the presentation of neglected mitigating evidence would not create
a "reasonable probability" of a different sentence than death, it usu-
ally would create some increased probability of a life sentence, a possi-
bility that the defendant is denied by the prejudice prong of Strickland.
One may on this ground criticize Strickland, 71 and both of us
would be quick to do so, were it not for the fact that the apparent
alternative-the double-edged sword doctrine-is far more destruc-
tive of the right to present mitigating evidence. Under the double-
edged sword, the reviewing court need not assess the competence of a
particular strategic decision because the wisdom, or even existence of
a strategic decision becomes irrelevant. This is because every claim
fails the prejudice prong: There is no need to calculate prejudice in
the context of the case, because the Fourth Circuit simply presumes
lack of prejudice by affixing the "double-edged" label to the un-
presented mitigating evidence. Thus, adoption of the double-edged
sword doctrine means that the right to present mitigating evidence
depends upon the defendant's wallet and his luck; only if he can buy a
good lawyer, or has the good fortune to be assigned one, does he have
the right to any meaningful presentation of mitigating evidence.
172
2. Robbing Ineffective Assistance Doctrine of Coherence.-Why should
courts not reverse all death sentences when available mitigating evi-
dence was not presented to the fact-finder? The answer to this ques-
tion, whether fully satisfying or not, lies in Strickland's dual rationale
for its deference to the reasonable strategic decisions of counsel. The
Strickland Court justified the requirement of deference first by noting
that hindsight is always biased, and that absent deference, speculation
that another course of action would have been wiser would be ram-
171. Strickland may of course be criticized on a number of grounds, including the vague-
ness of the standard of "reasonable competence," and consequent likelihood of lax en-
forcement, and the virtual impossibility of determining the likely results of competent
assistance, particularly in capital sentencing determinations. More broadly, Strickland re-
flects a very restricted view of the purpose of the constitutional guarantee of the assistance
of counsel: The only interest Strickland recognizes is the interest in reliability, neglecting
entirely the inherent importance of fundamentally fair procedures that respect the dignity
of the defendant. These criticisms are all foreshadowed in Justice Marshall's dissenting
opinion. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 706 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
172. See generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Penalty Not for the Worst
Crime butfor the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) (discussing the prevalence of dread-
ful representation of indigent capital defendants).
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pant. Concomitantly, the Court observed that there are countless
ways to provide effective assistance of counsel in any given case, but no
way to determine before trial which one is superior.
173
Neither of these rationales, however, justifies the double-edged
sword doctrine, or its far broader curtailment of the right to present
mitigating evidence. The double-edged sword doctrine neither defers
to reasonable strategy over hindsight nor defers to a particular law-
yer's choice of one among many strategies, for it does not depend
upon a reasonable strategic choice or even any choice at all. Instead it
usurps the trial lawyer's function of choosing among strategies with a
mechanical rule: No mitigation is as good as some mitigation-no
matter how powerful the available mitigation, no matter how marginal
the aggravating factors in the case, no matter how sympathetic the
defendant. Following this line of reasoning, one might next ask: Is
no lawyer as good as some lawyer? Lawyers themselves are also two-
edged swords, sometimes helping defendants and sometimes harming
them. 1
74
The Fourth Circuit may in fact be contemplating expansion of
the double-edged sword doctrine beyond its mental-health-mitiga-
tion/future-dangerousness-aggravation origins. In Howard v. Moore,
175
the en banc court deemed the failure to present evidence concerning
the defendant's prison record a "'double-edged sword' in that any fur-
ther evidence may have detrimentally highlighted his past criminal
record." This is a remarkable assertion given that trial counsel did
present similar but much weaker evidence that the defendant was co-
operative and remorseful during pretrial incarceration; counsel also
stated that he was aware of the defendant's very positive prison record
both from interviewing him and from counsel's investigator's report,
and yet made no effort to obtain Howard's more persuasive and ex-
173. Stickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
174. This is why the right to counsel is more accurately described as the right to the
assistance of counsel. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (holding that the
Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to personally make his defense, and
therefore implies the right of self-representation).
In a recent trial in Lexington County, South Carolina, a pro se defendant in a capital
case, Johnny Bennett, was sentenced to life imprisonment, a remarkable outcome given
that more defendants have been sentenced to death in Lexington County than in any
other county in the state. Mr. Bennett fired his attorneys over a dispute concerning the
presentation of mitigating evidence. That a lawyer may do more harm than good in one
case, however, hardly permits the conclusion that the absence of a lawyer should be pre-
sumed nonprejudicial.
175. 131 F.3d 399, 410-21 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 108 (1998).
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traordinarily positive federal prison records. 176 Certainly prison
adaptability, at least where unambiguous, as in Howard, is not double-
edged even in the way that mental illness is; given that the jury cer-
tainly will be informed of the defendant's prior criminal record by the
prosecutor, there is no foreseeable downside to presenting prison
adaptability evidence, and certainly no way that it could be inter-
preted as increasing the likelihood of future dangerousness. The ob-
server is left to wonder whether there is any right to the effective
assistance of counsel in sentencing in the Fourth Circuit.
The tide of this Article is harsh, but we think it is accurate. The
right to present mitigating evidence is figuratively eviscerated by its
total dependence on the ability and diligence of the counsel ap-
pointed in a particular case; the right to counsel is effectively be-
headed because no one is required actually to exercise judgment in
making strategy decisions, nor required to calculate the prejudice that
flowed from the failure to make such decisions in a particular case.
The violence of these metaphors is not accidental. The double-edged
sword doctrine departs from the specific precedent of Strickland, is in-
consistent with broader underlying Sixth and Eighth Amendment ju-
risprudence, and is contradicted by available empirical data. The
Fourth Circuit uses this doctrine to kill rights-and to kill people.
CONCLUSION
We have spent much of this Article on J.D. Gleaton's story, and
we have done so for several reasons. First is the fact that it was a
story-not just a case, but a man's story-that generated this confer-
ence. Gideon's story has proved extraordinarily powerful, moving not
only the Supreme Court, but a generation of public defenders. J.D.
Gleaton's story, however compelling to some readers, will never have
the wide appeal of Gideon's story. Why? Because J.D. was guilty, if
not of murder, at least of robbery and some form of homicide.
But in his very guilt lies the second reason to tell his story. The
only story that the jury heard was the story of his guilt. They did not
hear about the man-his weaknesses, his hardships, his disabilities, his
strengths-really, they did not hear about his humanity. Through its
176. One of the authors represented Howard. The records contained no reported mis-
conduct, and several glowing reports, all indicating the defendant's excellent adjustment
and adaptability to prison. Unit managers and a prison psychologist were in agreement.
Record at 2496-98, Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (No. 95-
4017). The makers of these reports signed affidavits stating that they would have appeared
at trial if they had been contacted.
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double-edged sword doctrine, the Fourth Circuit has declared that
failing to tell the jury that story does not matter.
The double-edged sword doctrine suggests that because some hy-
pothetical hard-hearted juror could have refused to consider mitigat-
ing evidence for the light it might have shed on J.D.'s humanity, J.D.
was not entitled to have an actual juror consider that humanity before
sentencing him to death. In short, the Fourth Circuit imagines the
worst juror as the only juror, and in so doing, reduces the right to
individualized capital sentencing to the right to be lucky.
But J.D. was more than his worst act, and most jurors are better
than the worst juror. While it is possible that ajury might have heard
all ofJ.D.'s story and still sentenced him to death, at least that process
would have acknowledged J.D's unique personhood, and it would
have permitted him to be judged for himself. J.D.'s lawyer should
have told his story. Because he did not, the Fourth Circuit judges
should have insisted that someone else do so. Instead, they allowed
the state of South Carolina to execute J.D. Gleaton on December 8,
1998, and we will never know whether a fair process would have let
him live.
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